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THE STEEDS' ARGUMENTS HAVE NEITHER BEEN 
WAIVED NOR FALL OUTSIDE THE MANDATE. 
The State argues that the Steeds cannot seek return of monies that were 
~ paid pursuant to the now-reversed convictions because, although the Steeds ap-
pealed the convictions, they did not ask that the consequences of the convictions 
also be vacated. This is like arguing that the convictions can be reversed but the 
sentence must stand because the defendants did not ask to be let out of jail. Like 
the incarceration orders, the challenged payments were incidents of the convic-
tions themselves; thus, when the convictions were reversed those penalties that 
were jurisdictionally dependent on the convictions were likewise reversed. 
In essence, the State is asking the Court to require an appellant to supply 
an itemized list of all conceivable consequences of reversal, or be forever subject 
,.,;;, to those consequences even though they have no underlying legal foundation. 
·Even the State acknowledges that the prison terms, the fines, the probation, and 
:.J the supervision requirements do not_ ~urvive the reversal. It is illogical to treat 
the other consequences of the very same conviction orders any differently. 
In the present case, the underlying notices of appeal identified the final 
judgments of conviction (R. 959-61 Goan); 1334-36 (Frank)), which included the 
probation conditions at issue here. The probation conditions were integral con-
sequences of the judgments appealed from, and their reversal is inherent in the 
reversal of those judgments of conviction. Indeed, a bare II conviction" without 
the accompanying sentencing is not even a final order for purposes of appeal. 
See State v. Ingleby, 2004 UT App 447, ,r 10, 104 P.3d 657. 
The State cites UDOT v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, 218 P.3d 583, for the proposition Gu 
that the mandate rule required the trial court to enter judgments of acquittal but .. 
precluded the trial court from undoing the consequences of the reversed orders. 
The Ivers case, however, does not stand for that proposition. In Ivers, the man-
date was to determine whether the already-condemned land was necessary to 
the highway project and if so to award severance damages. On remand, UDOT 
attempted to change the scope of the take, an action the court held impermissi-
ble. 2009 UT 56, if 1 14, 16. 
The State also cites J. Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud, 2007 UT App 88, 157 P.3d 
822, for the same proposition. In Smedsrud, however, the question was whether '-
the trial court was free to reconsider a garnishment order that had been specifi-
cally appealed and affirmed. Obviously, it was not. 2007 UT App 88, ,r 16. 
The foregoing cases do not preclude the trial court from undoing the con-
sequences of the reversed orders. Neither the waiver doctrine nor the mandate 
doctrine require the result the State seeks here. Rather, logic and common sense 
demand that unwinding the consequences of the reversed orders is inherent in, 
and indeed required by, the mandate to enter judgments of acquittal. To do oth-
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erwise would allow for the imposition of criminal penalties and consequences in 
~ the absence of criminal convictions. 
II. THE STATE TAX COMMISSION IS NOT A SEPARATE 
LEGAL ENTITY FOR PURPOSES OF THIS CASE. 
The State's second argument is that the State Tax Commission is a non-
party to the case and therefore cannot be compelled to return the funds it re-
~ ceived pursuant to the trial court's restitution order. The State cites State v. Lang, 
2009 UT 35, 212 P.3d 529, for the obvious proposition that the State is a party to a 
criminal case. The case actually involved an attempt by a victim to file a notice of 
appeal and stands for the proposition that the victim is not a party to a criminal 
case. 2009 UT 35, 1 16. 
The State cites no authority in support of its argument that the tax com-
mission is a legal entity separate from the State. There is nothing in the code to 
suggest that the commission, which collects taxes for the State of Utah, is sepa-
rate from the State. The State cites no statute that requires the commission to 
'ii segregate income tax funds and associated penalties, or to otherwise maintain a 
barrier or distinction between itself and the State. 
To the contrary, the code provides that the commission "shall represent 
the state in a matter pertaining to the collection of a tax, fee, or charge." UTAH 
CODE§ 59-1-1403(6). This suggests that, in the context of collection of taxes and 
penalties-which is the context here if the restitution order is disregarded- the 
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commission is the State. And that is consistent with the way this case was prose-
cuted: the tax commission investigated it and provided the information to Mr. 4"' 
Baer who, although he works for the attorney general, is assigned to the tax 
commission and handles tax cases. 
Next, the State relies on the statutory process for obtaining a refund of a 
tax or penalty assessed by the commission. See UTAH CODE§ 59-1-1410(8). The 
cited code section provides a civil process for the commission to assess a tax, fee, 
or charge, provides that the commission may not do so after three years have 
passed, and describes the process one must follow to obtain a refund of an as-
sessment imposed under those circumstances. By laying out certain procedures, 
the code ensures that an individual receives adequate process and opportunity to 
challenge the amount of the fee or charge. See UTAH CODE§§ 59-1-1405, -1410. In 
this case, the commission did not-and now cannot because of the passage of ~ 
time-assess the penalties and interest at issue. Rather than supporting the 
State's position, the section reinforces the Steeds' position that the statutory as-
sessment scheme and the statutory refund scheme go hand-in-hand. The refund 
scheme is not applicable because the State elected not to follow the statutory as-
sessment scheme. 
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III. THE STEEDS ARE ENTITLED TO A REFUND OF ALL 
FEES AND COSTS PAID FOR PROBATION AND INCAR-
CERATION. 
The State finally reaches the merits of the Steeds' arguments at page 13 of 
its brief. The State's argument, however, ignores the cases cited in the Steeds' 
opening brief. Those cases stand for the proposition that a judgment of acquittal 
deprives the trial court of the jurisdiction to impose penalties, State v. Piekkola, 90 
S.D. 335, 241 N.W.2d 563, 564 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Estate 
of Erdmann, 447 N.W.2d 356 (S.D. 1989), and for the further proposition that the 
touchstone for triggering the defendant's due process rights in this area is the co-
ercive nature of the trial court's sentencing orders, State v. Lewis, 342 F. Supp. 833 
~ (E.D. La. 1972), aff d, 478 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1973). 
Instead, the State attempts to sidestep the due process problem with the 
argument that the Steeds owed the tax and the commission could have imposed 
the penalties. It is a "no-harm no-foul" argument that characterizes the State as 
having lost a "gamble" and ignores the procedural realities of the _case at hand. 
Whether the commission could have imposed a penalty is irrelevant. The 
fact is that it chose not to do so. Instead, the commission took a shortcut the 
trial court simply imposed a 20 percent surcharge, plus interest, and threatened 
the Steeds with immediate imprisonment if they did not pay it. This is not the 
~ statutory assessment process. It is the coercive process of criminal sentencing. 
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The statutory civil process was not triggered and the Steeds were not afforded a 
forum to argue that a penalty was not appropriate, or that the penalty was exces-
sive under the circumstances. 1 
The State correctly argues that the obligation to pay penalties II does not ¼iJ' 
depend" on a criminal conviction or imposition of a restitution order. While in 
the abstract neither conviction nor restitution is required in order for the com-
mission to assess a penalty, that abstraction has no place here. Here, the penalty 
udepends" on the restitution order because restitution incident to the convictions 
was the basis the State chose for imposition of the penalties. The commission did 
not assess the penalty based on civil process or a statutory proceeding. 
In a parallel argument, the State argues that the Steeds had 11independent 
C?bligations" to pay the penalties and interest. This is simply incorrect. No obli-
gation to pay penalties and interest arose under the tax code until assessment by ~ 
the commission. See UTAH CODE§§ 59-1-1401 et seq. (containing procedures for 
assessments. The code affords the State a statutory civil process for imposing the 
1 In the federal system prior to 2010, the I.RS. routinely pursued separate civil 
assessments independent of the criminal conviction to determine the amount of 
tax liability. See, e.g., Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Memo 
No. 200734020, at 4-5 (Oct. 2, 2006), available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
wd/0734020.pdf (distinguishing between civil and criminal orders). In 2010, 
C~ngress amended the Internal Revenue Code to clarify that restitution could be 
awarded in criminal cases involving violations of federal tax law, but provided 
that the I.R.S. - rather than the court charged with sentencing- would civilly as-
. sess the restitution amount, and only after criminal appeals had been exhausted. 
See 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a)(4). 
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penalties. The process would also have afforded the Steeds their due process 
~ rights. The process was not followed, however, so no statutory obligation exists. 
Finally, the State argues that the only effect of the acquittals was to ensure 
~ that the Steeds would not go to prison if they violated the restitution order. This 
argument simply illustrates the ridiculous result that follows if a judgment of ac-
quittal does not remove the jurisdictional premise for imposition of fines, penal-
ties, and restitution. The State is correct that the acquittals did not excuse the 
Steeds from obeying the law, but the State is incorrect to insist that the acquittals 
did not excuse the Steeds from the requirements of the restitution order that was 
premised on the now-reversed convictions. 
IV. EVEN IN THE CASE OF RESTITUTION PAID TO NON-
p ARTIES, THE BEITER POLICY APPROACH IS TO RE-
QUIRE RETURN OF THE FUNDS FROM THE STATE. 
Although this case does not present the question whether or how restitu-
tion payments should be recovered from a non-governmental third-party victim, 
the Steeds recognize that that question lurks in the background of this case and is 
at least tangentially raised by the issue of the recovery of the II pay-for-stay" 
funds from Wasatch County. The issue was confronted in State v. Parker, 872 
P.2d 1041 (1994), but the resulting decision-discussed extensively in the Steeds' 
opening brief- is so fractured that no clear guiding principle emerges from it. 
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The Colorado appellate courts recently grappled with this issue in People v. 
Nelson, 2013 COA 58, 2013 WL 1760903 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013), rev'd, 2015 CO 68, 
362 P.3d 1070 (Colo. 2015). The case involved a defendant who had been con-
victed of child abuse through the testimony of a forensic interviewer who should lii.J 
not have been qualified as an expert. The conviction was reversed, and then the 
defendant was acquitted in a second trial. In the interim, however, she had been 
incarcerated and had paid restitution and other costs associated with the convic-
tion. The trial court denied her request for return of those funds. 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court. It held that the defendant 
was entitled to seek recovery of not just fines and penalties, but all funds paid as 
restitution, reasoning that the trial court had an obligation to vacate all aspects of 
the overturned conviction because the state had "failed to prove that the defend-
ant is guilty." 2013 COA 58, 1 20. The court went on to hold that the repayment G;.. 
should come from the state, not the ultimate recipient of the restitution, reason-
ing persuasively: 
In reaching our conclusion here, we are not unmindful of the 
fact that in certain cases, the state may be required to refund monies 
that it has already disbursed to third parties (i.e., people and entities 
not controlled by the state). For several reasons, however, we be-
lieve that such a result is reasonable and appropriate. 
First, it was the state's action that ultimately resulted in the 
wrongful payment of restitution. 
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Second, when the state chose to disburse the funds, it neces-
sarily assumed the risk that the conviction could ultimately be over-
turned. 
Third, we do not believe it appropriate to create a scenario in 
which former criminal defendants are left to seek out and file law-
suits or other proceedings against third parties, and especially crime 
victims, to recover the restitution amounts that the defendants pre-
viously paid. 
Fourth, when a former defendant seeks a refund from the 
state, there is nothing to preclude the state, in its discretion, from 
seeking to recover such restitution amounts from the third parties, 
and we view this as a more palatable option, given that the state 
would have had prior dealings with the victims and any service 
providers. In addition, the state would be in the best position to as-
sess whether the amount of the restitution at issue or the impact on 
the victims or service providers justifies any effort to recover such 
funds. 
Finally, in a situation like that present here, where either the 
former defendant or the state must bear the risk of a wrongly paid 
restitution award, we believe that the risk should rest with the state, 
which collected the restitution funds but then ultimately failed to 
prove its case and which would likely be better able to bear the risk. 
2013 COA 58, 11 28-33. 
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. While not 
disagreeing that the defendant was entitled to return of restitution,2 it held that 
the defendant could not pursue that claim by motion in the criminal case, in part 
~ because the state constitution and prior case law prevented Colorado courts from 
u authorizing a refund from public funds without statutory authority to do so." 
2 Colorado has previously held, in People v. Hargrave, 179 P.3d 226, 229-30 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2007), that the trial court has ancillary jurisdiction to entertain a post-
conviction motion for the return of property. 
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2015 CO 68, ,r 34. Applying this principle, the court held that she was required to 
file a separate suit under the Colorado Exoneration Act, which provides a reme-
dy for those who are II factually innocent" but wrongfully convicted. Id., ,r 44. 
In a dissent, Justice Hood methodically dismantled the majority's reason- ~ 
mg. He noted that the Exoneration Act places the burden on the defendant to 
prove factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, and thus reverses the 
presumption of innocence that should be available to the acquitted defendant 
2015 CO 68, Dissent ,r 12. "[R]eversal is reversal. And an invalid conviction is 
no conviction at all." Id., ,r 9. "ffiust as the State was required to release Nelson 
from incarceration, it should also be required to release Nelson's money paid as 
costs, fees, and restitution." Id., ,r 6. 11Refunds simply recognize that the legisla-
ture lacks power to punish people who have not been validly convicted." Id., 
,r 21. 
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act, UTAH CODE §§ 78B-9-101 et seq., is 
not susceptible to the majority's analysis in Nelson, and thus reinforces the con-
clusion that the reasoning of the court of appeals and of the dissent is more per-
suasive. Utah's act, like Colorado's, reverses the burden of proof, requiring the 
claimant to prove factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Id., § 78B-
9-404(1 )(b). Both acts provide for a specific monetary remedies. Id., § 78B-9-
-10-
405(1)(a). Unlike Colorado, however, the Utah Act is silent on the question of re-
fund of fines, restitution, and other penalties. 
Most importantly, however, the Utah Act only applies to a person uwho 
has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal .... " Id., § 78B-
9-102. See also § 78B-9-106(1)(a) (I.I A person is not eligible for relief under this 
chapter upon any ground that may still be raised on direct appeal .... "). The 
remedy under the Utah Act is only available to "[a] person who has been con-
victed of a felony offense .... " Id., § 78B-9-402(1). The Steeds, however, have 
not been convicted. A jury found them guilty, but the trial court's order was re-
versed on appeal and a judgment of acquittal was entered. The Steeds were not 
convicted and then acquitted or found factually innocent. They were acquitted. 
By its plain language, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act is not applicable to a 
person who was not convicted ... Consequently, the remedies and process spelled 
out in the Act have no application to the Steeds. Although not stated quite this 
plainly, this is the foundational premise of Judge Hood's dissent in Nelson as 
well. 
Thus, to the extent the court views this case as involving a request for re-
fund from a non-party to the criminal case, the Steeds urge the reasoning of the 
Colorado Court of Appeals and Justice Hood's dissent as persuasive and rational 
from a policy perspective. It is the State that accepted and disbursed the Steeds' 
-11-
money knowing that the case was on appeal.3 It is therefore the State that took 
the risk that its actions might be premature, and it is the State that has the ability, 
and the obligation, to return the money it accepted and disbursed. Requiring a 
criminal defendant.to retain counsel and to then pursue a civil case against a vie- '-
tim and others is not necessary, and would be a poor policy choice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants request that this Court reverse the 
trial court's judgment insofar as it refused to refund the restitution, incarceration 
costs, and supe~ision fees that were imposed as a consequence of the convic-
tions. 
DATED this Jh. day of March, 2016. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
B~B 
Attorneys for Appellants 
C:\NRPORTBL\IDOCS\RRP\3621942_1.DOCX:3/16/16 
3 If the State lost a "gamble," it was only because it chose to disburse the restitu-
tion monies before the judgments of conviction became final. The State knew 
within 12 days that the Steeds had appealed. (R. 959-61, 971-73.) It assumed the 
risk of reversal when it disbursed funds without waiting for a final disposition 
on appeal. See United States v. Hayes, 385 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2004) ("if the 
government retains the monies until the conviction becomes final and then dis-
tributes it to identifiable victims ... the defendant has no right to recover any 
such sums from the government."). 
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